



## **Project Lumos:**

# **A Solutions Blueprint for Solving the Spam Problem by Establishing Volume Email Sender Accountability**

**White Paper  
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**Abstract:** Unsolicited commercial email, or spam, is an overwhelming problem for consumers, businesses, non-commercial organizations, and Internet Services Providers. A cornerstone to solving the spam problem is to hold email senders accountable for the mail they send and their sending practices. This white paper proposes a federated Registry model for registering and certifying volume email senders. The proposed federated Registry will provide services to ensure a secure representation of the sender's identity, adherence of the sender to applicable public procedures and policies, and assessment of the sender's performance. By including the Registry information in the SMTP mail header of certified email, receiving email gateways can make more accurate and consistent decisions regarding the processing of incoming email.

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# 1. Executive Summary

Unsolicited commercial email, or spam, is consistently identified as one of the primary issues for consumers, businesses, non-commercial organizations, and Internet Services Providers (ISPs). Spam represents a substantial proportion of the billions of emails sent each day, and the volume of spam is increasing exponentially. A recent analysis from Brightmail suggests that by September 2003, as much as 50% of all email will be classified as spam by the recipient. Some ISPs report that spam is already exceeding this level by a considerable amount.

The volume of spam adversely affects recipients of the email and the providers of email services. All organizations that receive mail - ISP's, businesses, governments, and institutions - are experiencing rising costs as the magnitude of email continues to increase. Spam impacts employee productivity by forcing employees to sort through their inboxes for pertinent communications, and systems administrators are fighting a losing battle in their attempt to stem the spam flood before it reaches individual mailboxes. To many individuals, the incidence of pornographic spam to their inboxes is offensive, and could represent a legal liability to organizations. Lastly, spam is frequently the medium used to defraud consumers and steal personal and financial information. While quantifying the cost of the effects of spam is difficult to measure, it is unquestionable that spam threatens the trustworthiness and viability of email and eCommerce.

In an effort to curb unwanted and offensive email, organizations and individuals have implemented anti-spam measures that include blacklists, whitelists, and content filters. These solutions are fundamentally heuristic and have their own inherent problems. Anti-spam measures are not perfect in their ability to distinguish spam from legitimate email. A study by Assurance Systems in the fourth quarter of 2002 found that the top 10 email account providers' spam detection software incorrectly identified an average of 15% of legitimate email as spam and consequently did not deliver it to the inbox.

Because Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is not secure, it is exploited by illegitimate bulk mailers to obscure their identity and forge their email headers. Illegitimate mailers are thereby able to send millions of fraudulent spam messages with indifference to any repercussions.

The flexibility of email content and origin in the current infrastructure, combined with the heuristic nature of the current spam fighting tools, results in a never-ending cat and mouse game of attempts at detection by the spam solutions and deception by the spammers.

This white paper presents a blueprint for an extension to the existing email infrastructure that aims to eliminate spam by holding high volume senders and Email Service Providers (ESPs) accountable for the mail they send and their sending practices. Project Lumos proposes the establishment of one or more federated Registries to provide certified sender identity and performance reputation information to receiving email gateways. By providing identity and reputation information, receiving email gateways can make more accurate decisions about how to process incoming email.

There are three key aspects proposed in the Project Lumos architecture.

- I. One or more federated Registries that provide:
  - Certification for high volume email Senders and ESPs upon verification of identity. Upon certification, the Registry issues the Sender or ESP a secure identity. The secure identity is a set of electronic credentials based on Public Key Infrastructure cryptography that can be used to authenticate the source and content of email.
  - Volume Email Standards for bounce handling, abuse report handling, unsubscribe handling, and similar technical standards.
  - Reputation Services that link identity information to performance data, and an objective Performance Rating. This information would be available to anyone who requests it.

II. Volume email processing provisions for:

- Enhancement to email headers (new X-Headers) to include identity and other information required to securely distinguish the sender and support the reputation engine.
- Enhancements by receiving Email Gateways to utilize the modified email headers, validate the email source, and check the objective Performance Rating of the Sender and ESP (from one or more registry sources).

III. A set of standards for reporting reputation data and scoring, including:

- A mechanism for collecting and reporting the raw performance data for senders and ESPs. Raw performance data includes incoming volume, hard bounce counts, unsubscribe requests and complaints as seen by the Receiving Email Gateway.
- A Performance Rating service to calculate performance ratings for registered entities.

Each of these aspects is further described in the body of this white paper along with proposals for the implementation of certification and classification schemes, volume email standards, and an illustrative example of performance measurement and rating algorithms.

With access to the secure identity information, performance data, and performance ratings from a Registry, the recipient organizations' email gateways can implement rules and make decisions with regard to processing incoming email. Based on the sender's reputation, email gateways have the option of passing email freely, subjecting it to a series of anti-spam filters, routing mail to a bulk mail folder, or blocking the email altogether.

All of the technologies required to implement this proposal exist today. Implementation will be phased in over an approximate 18-24 month timeframe. Phase 1 entails commercial high volume ESPs publishing their mail server IP addresses and providing the new X-Headers. This affords crude measures of performance, and provides a minimum level of identity. Phase 2 sees basic sender and server certification, and secure identity services established. Performance tracking will be implemented in Phase 3. And Phase 4 incorporates the more detailed aspects of certification and mail categorization.

A few key outstanding questions must be addressed prior to implementation. First, who will own and operate the Registries and under what business model? Second, is there a requirement for an external organization to oversee the operation of the Registries and provide a dispute resolution mechanism? And lastly, how will Project Lumos work with the appropriate bodies to create the standards necessary to ensure effective definition and communication of the identity and performance data?

The Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) Email Service Provider Coalition (ESPC) has no current plans to implement this solution on its own, but is offering this blueprint as a framework around which a solution can be built. This white paper calls for broad participation and feedback on the proposed framework and the detailed aspects contained herein.

# Introduction

## 2.1 Paper Objective

This white paper describes a systems architecture approach to solving the growing spam problem by making modifications to how high-volume senders and receivers of email interoperate. The architecture consists of a set of federated registries responsible for implementing and operating the proposed solution.

## 2.2 The Problem with Identifying Spam

Spam filtering as it exists to today is imprecise. Not only does it fail to catch a great deal of spam, and incorrectly mark legitimate email as spam, current spam filtering solutions are unable to verify that the mail was actually sent by the sender that is identified in the email. Further, maintaining spam filter settings on requires constant attention because spammers continuously change their practices to circumvent filtering tools.

The use of email filtering software is a widely accepted tool for distinguishing spam. Email filtering software (at the incoming mail gateway and/or the user's personal computer) applies content and header-based analysis rules to identify spam and remove it from the system. However, cleverly written emails often evade the logic of the software, and configuring the filters to catch spam without a percentage of false positives is impossible.

Organizations also use 'blacklists' or 'blocklists' of IP addresses compiled by members of the Internet community to identify potential spam sources. The receiving mail gateways are configured to block all mail from these sources. However, even the operators of these lists acknowledge that blacklists are imprecise and can result in blocking email from legitimate senders and IP addresses. The outcome of blocking legitimate senders and IPs is collateral damage, or put more plainly, wanted email does not get delivered to the intended recipient.

If the ability to evade these filtering techniques isn't enough, the current Simple Mail Transfer protocol (SMTP), by design, is not secure. SMTP makes it easy for illegitimate bulk commercial mailers to use technology to forge email headers and obscure their identities. Spammers routinely misrepresent the email sender information in the SMTP headers, and may even lie about their identity in an attempt to get their messages delivered.

Information falsification combined with the use of 'open proxies', further enables illegitimate senders to conceal their identities. By accessing incorrectly configured email servers or computers hijacked through viruses or by hacking, spammers send millions of anonymous spam messages.

It's time for legitimate senders who have nothing to hide to stand up and identify themselves so that the those who have built their business on 'tricking' spam detection mechanisms can no longer operate in the dark.

## 2.3 Terminology and Definitions

The following terminology is used throughout this white paper:

- Sender - The term 'sender', when used with respect to a commercial electronic mail message, means an organization or person who initiates such a message and whose product, service, or

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<sup>1</sup> Press Release, see <http://www.brightmail.com/>, Brightmail, San Francisco, CA, July 1, 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Fourth Quarter Email Blocking and Filtering Report, see <http://www.assurancesys.com/>, Assurance Systems, Superior, CO, Feb. 2003.

- Internet web site is advertised or promoted by the message. The Sender is usually designated by the "Mail From:" line in the email header.
- Mail Server – The term 'mail server' is used to designate the physical machine that sends the email (the MTA or Message Transfer Agent).
  - Email Service Provider – The term 'Email Service Provider', or "ESP", is used to represent the Sender's agent, the organization which operates one or more mail servers. The ESP may be a separate group within the Sender's own organization (such as an IT Department), an ISP, Web mail provider (such as Yahoo, MSN, AOL, etc.), a public mail list operator, or a commercial email services provider (such as a member of the ESP Coalition listed in the Appendix).
  - Recipient – The term 'Recipient', when used with respect to a commercial electronic mail message, means an authorized user of the electronic mail address to which the message was sent or delivered<sup>4</sup>.
  - Receiving Email Gateway – The term 'Receiving Email Gateway' or 'Gateway' is used to designate the machines that receive the email. This can be a single machine or an installation consisting of firewalls, filters, servers, etc. ISPs, enterprises, or other organizations operate gateways on behalf of the email recipients.
  - Identity – The term 'Identity' is used to describe the verified and certified unique identification of a person, commercial organization, or non-commercial organization.
  - Reputation – The term 'Reputation' describes a measure of the overall quality of a Sender or ESP as judged by the external community. The reputation of senders is largely established by the email recipients.
  - Campaign – The term 'Campaign' designates a unique volume email occurrence from a particular Sender and/or ESP to a broad range of recipients.
  - Unsubscribe – The term 'Unsubscribe' designates a request from a recipient to no longer receive any mailings (on any topic) from a particular Sender.
  - OptOut - Unsubscribe
  - Registry – The 'Registry' designates an organization that provides an email sender reputation engine, certification services, and publishes a set of standards that it enforces on all registered senders.
  - Internet Email Trust Authority (IETA) – a Registry

## 2.4 Project Lumos Solution Overview


In today's environment, it is expensive for mail gateways to monitor incoming email and determine what is legitimate mail and what is spam. While the largest mail gateways (large ISPs) have dedicated resources to this task, smaller ISPs and mail systems administrators do not always have the knowledge or the resources to manage the task. Project Lumos proposes the establishment of a federated model of registries to implement sender accountability. By mandating that senders provide certified proof of identity to the receiving email gateways, in addition to providing historical performance measures about the sender, any recipient can confidently decide what email they want to receive and what email they do not want to receive.

The role of Registry is to verify the identity of high volume email senders and ESPs, and issue electronic credentials that allow receiving mail gateways to authenticate mail coming from the certified sender or ESP. As part of the terms of registration, a Registry will also require that senders and ESPs commit to adhering to a set of well defined, public Volume Email Standards and procedures. The Registry also creates and maintains an electronic record of the sending organization, including its sending policy statement, in its public Registry. Figure 1 shows a high level functional view of a Registry.

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<sup>3</sup> S.877 CAN SPAM Act of 2003, section 3, introduced to the US Senate April 10, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.



**Fig. 1 – Functional View of the Registry Model**

In addition to establishing Registries, Project Lumos proposes enhancements to the Volume Email Delivery process that will introduce a secure method of including the sender and ESP identity in the email header. By providing this information in the email header, receiving email gateways can validate the source of the email. These enhancements can also be used to authenticate the content of the email, and communicate permission-oriented information such as trusted unsubscribe and abuse reporting mechanisms.

The final component proposed by Project Lumos is a process to monitor and report the performance of registered senders and ESPs. Data from receiving email gateways will be combined with information from recipients about abuse complaints and repeat unsubscribe requests. This information will be used to objectively rate the performance of the registered senders and ESPs.

A good reputation, as demonstrated by a high performance rating, can only be established through consistently good behavior. Since reputation is linked to identity, Project Lumos encourages senders to maintain their identity. The coupling of identity and reputation is therefore critical to ensuring that senders and ESPs don't attempt to defeat the system by "churning" identities.

Implementing the proposed federated Registry model requires an open, decentralized physical architecture and inter-operable standards for information sharing. It is not merely a point solution. The Blueprint first assumes that there will likely be multiple implementations of Registries, and second, that the different functions of a Registry may be implemented and operated by separate organizations working in partnership.

## 2.5 White Paper Outline

Section 3 presents a deeper look at the requirements for a solution to the problems created by spam. This is followed in Section 4 by a description of the proposed technical solution for the overall architecture and the key components. Section 5 presents a workable, phased implementation or transition plan to implement the blueprint, and Section 6 contains conclusions and identifies next steps required for the implementation.

Appendices provide acknowledgements, a list of resources and information about other complementary initiatives, additional information about the NAI ESPC, contact information, and a concise set of FAQs about the blueprint.

# Business Requirements for a Solution

## 3.1 Accountability

Any comprehensive solution to the spam problem requires that email recipients be able to hold senders and ESPs accountable for the quality of their email. Senders and ESPs who establish a good reputation (i.e. a high performance rating) will be trusted and their email will be routed to recipients. At the same time, volume mail from unknown senders, known senders with no demonstrated performance, or those registered senders who have exhibited poor performance, will be held accountable for their past behavior and subjected to additional filtering or even blocking of their mailings.

In order to achieve this accountability, a complete solution must:

- Eliminate the ability for high volume senders to hide their identities,
- Provide a secure mechanism for validating the sender of incoming email,
- Ensure that a certified sender's identity may not be impersonated nor their content modified by an illicit third party,
- Establish minimum volume email standards (volumes, bounce rates, bounce handling, etc.) to which registered senders and ESPs must adhere,
- Provide a mechanism for monitoring sender and ESP compliance with contractually binding standards by tracking their performance and determining an objective rating of performance,
- Allow Email Gateways access to sender and EPS identity information and performance ratings to use in implementing its local delivery policies,
- Place no burden on small, anonymous senders,
- The architectural changes must allow for transparent inter-working with senders who are not registered, and
- The architectural changes must allow for transparent inter-working with email gateways and pre-existing technology solutions that do not to implement identity or reputation checking.

The following sub-sections define each of these high level requirements in more detail.

## 3.2 Secure Identity of the Sender

### 3.2.1 Sender Certification

Through the sender certification process, high-volume senders and ESPs are required to authenticate their identity and commit to follow acceptable industry guidelines for sending volume email.

Specific requirements of certification include:

- Volume email senders and ESPs provide legal proof of identity.
- Certification is available at different levels, depending on the intended volume of email and degree of certainty that a sender's ID can be authenticated. Some Registries may choose to implement only certain levels of certification.
- Senders and ESPs contractually commit to the Registry's volume email standards as part of the certification process.
- Approved senders and ESPs are issued 'electronic credentials' that certify their identity.
- The certification process must not be cost prohibitive to small businesses and small, non-commercial list servers.
- Electronic credentials can be revoked should they be compromised.


### 3.2.2 Sender Identity

Intuitively, sender identity is a simple idea – it is a person or organization that is responsible for the creation and initiation of email content, or who is facilitating email delivery. Perusing an inbox may reveal senders such as ‘Bob Smith’, ‘orders@redenvelope.com’, ‘Origins Online’, ‘United Airlines’, or ‘Nordstrom’. The Lumos sender identity is intended to make those identities secure, so that the recipient can be confident that the sender is who they say they are.

Despite the simplicity of the sender identity concept, determining level to which assign sender identity and performance ratings is not so simple. Large organizations often operate in a decentralized fashion, with different divisions publishing their own documents. For example, AOL Time Warner includes brands such as AOL and “This Old House”. How many TOH newsletter recipients know, or care, that the TOH website is owned by AOL Time Warner and not the television station that produces the show? Does the performance of the TOH email get attributed to TOH? AOL? Time Warner? All of the above?

The structure of the Identity, and the resulting certification process, must provide for Certification of the corporate Identity at the highest level, in addition to individual identities to be issued within the context of the corporation. Similarly, the system must be flexible enough to measure the performance of an individual “division”, and to aggregate all “division” performance ratings to an aggregate organization performance rating. This encourages the overall organization to exert some control over their departments and subsidiaries.

A hierarchical Identity structure is required to meet the above requirements. The structure should allow for an arbitrary number of levels in an “identity tree”. For instance, an organization may have as many sub-identities as they want, but they are all tied to the top-level identity. Each sub-identity will have its own Reputation or performance rating, while the top-level identity’s performance rating is the combination of its sub-identities. An example of a three level identity structure is shown in Fig. 2.



**Fig. 2 – Example of a Hierarchical Identity Structure**

To prevent churn and disposal of sub-identities with poor performance ratings, sub-identity ratings cannot be removed from the top level rating until they have been dormant for an extended period (e.g. three years). In a large organization one wayward division is unlikely to overly harm the overall rating, but allowing poor performers to repeatedly obtain a new identity and repeat the inappropriate behaviors, will eventually impact the corporation’s overall reputation.

### 3.2.3 Individual and Anonymous Senders

The Internet has been the great equalizer – individuals can now communicate over long distances where the previous alternatives were either slow or expensive or both. With anonymity, free (or freer) speech is available to far more people than it has at any time in the past. These valuable features must be preserved.

Small and anonymous senders are sending via some sort of ESP – be it their corporate gateway, an inbox provider such as Yahoo or HotMail, or a broadband or dial-up provider. For these senders, there is no individual reputation but their identity is marked as low volume by their ESP. Recipients can therefore trust that the email from such an individual is extremely unlikely to be spam.

In all cases, the sender has some sort of account with their provider. Under the Lumos scheme, the ESPs are rated. To maintain their rating, service providers to small and anonymous senders limit their members to a number below which sending spam is not cost effective. A limit of, for example, 100 messages per day is a very large number for an individual, but an inconsequential number for a commercial message of any kind.

Currently, providers of free or low cost mailboxes and mailing services have a variety of fraud prevention mechanisms that prevent individuals from abusing their systems by sending large volumes of email for little or no cost. These fraud prevention systems will now have an additional incentive – allowing abuse will not just eat up bandwidth, but will threaten the service provider's reputation rating, which in turn will threaten the viability of their service for all of their customers.

## 3.3 Objective Performance Rating of Senders and ESPs

The definition of 'spam' and what comprises acceptable permission to send email has been the subject of much debate, yet the industry remains no closer to a consensus definition. Ultimately, spam is in the eye of the Recipient and is extremely context sensitive ... 'that which I do not wish to receive is spam'. Any solution to spam must leave ultimate control to determine what they do and do not want to receive up to the recipient. By creating an objective rating mechanism on a known scale, Project Lumos avoids the black/white labels that have proven to be unmanageable and impractical. As the rating system evolves, senders and ESPs will develop best practices that their recipients find acceptable. These practices may be different for different uses of email, in different markets, or for different recipient communities.

In order to establish the performance of senders and ESPs, a mechanism must first be established for capturing performance data. Second, a service must be established in order to make the aggregate performance data and ratings available to email gateways. These functions may be performed by Registries or may evolve as a separate, third party services. The following two sections describe some of the requirements for capturing performance data and rating senders.

### 3.3.1 Capturing Performance Data

Continuous performance measurement is required to establish the reputation of both senders and ESPs.

Therefore receiving email gateways will:

- Measure performance of incoming mail streams including the following information:
  - Email rate and Volume;
  - Bounce rates and handling;
  - Presence and accuracy of the additional information required in headers.
- Report performance data for senders and ESPs to their certifying Registries.
- Route (redirect) unsubscribe requests to the Registry prior to being forwarded to the sender (thus allowing automatic monitoring of unsubscribe request handling).
- Copy Abuse reports ('spam reports' from end recipients) to the Registry as well as the sender or ESP.

### 3.3.2 Performance Rating Services

Performance ratings will be generated and published based on aggregated information from a number of email gateways. In order to accomplish this, a performance monitoring service must:

- Ensure that it can accept the performance information from a wide number and variety of gateways.
- Continually produce and update the performance ratings of registered senders and ESPs.
- Design and implement a rating algorithm such that higher performance ratings will be earned as the senders or ESPs demonstrate good performance over time, similar to a consumer's credit rating.
- Include a "damping function" in the rating algorithm so that more recent events have a higher importance than past history. The weight of historical performance nevertheless outperforms any single event.
- Make performance data and rating information available to all large and small organizations' email gateways (and potentially other "competing" rating services) through standard query and response formats.

### 3.4 Required Changes for Outgoing Volume Email

Once senders and ESPs have been registered, Project Lumos proposes that enhancements the way registered email is generated and sent to allow receiving email gateways to authenticate the sender and (optionally) verify the authenticity of the content of their emails.

Enhancing the volume email sending process will include:

- Inclusion of electronic credentials of both the sender and ESP within the email headers.
- A security mechanism that will ensure no identity theft i.e. use of the credentials by any unknown party.
- A mechanism to ensure that the content of the emails may not be modified or that the email headers are not pre-pended to the body of other emails.
- A mechanism to ensure non-repudiation of the email and its content by the sender.
- A mechanism to ensure that the identity of sender and originating ESP may be confirmed at any point in the delivery chain.
- Appropriate permission-based email information such as unsubscribe and abuse reporting information in a standard fashion when appropriate.
- A mechanism that ensures reasonable overhead and processing cost for the encryption/decryption to enable volume use.

### 3.5 Recommended Changes for Incoming Volume Email Processing

Project Lumos assumes that email gateways will make certain changes to process the identity and reputation information for registered senders and ESPs. While Project Lumos ensures that an email gateway will be able to continue to receive email without implementing any changes, the benefits of secure sender identity can only be realized with some infrastructure upgrades.

Upgrading the volume email receiving process may include some or all the following:

- Reading electronic credentials of both the sender and ESP from the email headers.
- Decoding the secure (encrypted) signatures to ensure their authenticity.
- Checking the content of the message for authenticity.
- Look up performance ratings for authenticated sender and ESP.
- Use of performance rating and/or internal historical information in order to determine how to process the sender's email.
- Passing email through to end user mail client and indicating in the mail client that the message is from a verified source.

Monitor and aggregate information about sender and ESP performance in order to report back to the performance monitoring service.

## **3.6 Implementation and Operational Considerations**

### **3.6.1 Implementation Requirements**

Implementation of the Blueprint processes, standards, and physical components must meet a number of practical considerations. These include the following:

- All new standards introduced must be fully backwards compatible with existing email standards to allow inter-working with current servers and gateways, both for an extended transition period and for many servers that may not be upgraded.
- Implementation should allow for gradual transition to a fully cryptographically secure technology. Initial authentication may rely on an IP based solution providing the ID. It is the belief of Project Lumos that the email infrastructure must migrate to a fully secure implementation of digital signatures.
- The implementation must leverage existing technology infrastructure, such as digital signatures, certificates, encryption algorithms, etc. wherever possible to speed the transition and reduce the cost burden.
- All new data formats and protocols must be open standards based.
- Registries must provide a high level of performance so as not to impact email services.
- All data sources and communications must be compliant with the relevant national and international Privacy guidelines.
- The architecture and Registry implementation must be Anti-Trust Compliant, not precluding operation of competitive services for certification, performance monitoring and Registry functions.

### **3.6.2 Operational Requirements**

Operation of the Registry or multiple Registries should be performed by trusted third parties. These third parties must be objective in their certification of senders and setting of policies and performance standards.

In addition to providing oversight and management of the certification and performance monitoring processes, Registry operators should provide access to a dispute resolution process for registered parties that do not feel their ratings accurately reflect the data or have had their certification revoked. The oversight function may imply a need to perform audits of registered senders and ESPs when required. The Trust Authority function could be implemented by third party entities such as TRUSTe or possibly firms such as Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) or Ernst & Young (E&Y).



## 4. Technical Description

### 4.1 Architecture Overview

As previously outlined, Project Lumos is a blueprint for an extension to the existing email infrastructure that eliminates spam by holding all volume senders accountable for the mail they send and their sending practices.

Figure 3 below provides an overview of the end state of the proposed systems architecture. Key components of the architecture include:

Registries – offering:

- Certification Services to validate the identity of senders and ESPs;
- Registration Services of certified senders and ESPs;
- Volume Email Standards: agreed to by the senders and ESPs during the registration process;
- Reputation Services: a repository of identity, performance data and rating information.

Enhanced Volume Email Delivery process encompassing:

- Enhancements to the email headers (new X-Headers) that provides Sender and ESP authentication information in the form of digital signatures, standardized, trusted unsubscribe links, abuse reporting information, etc.; and
- Receiving email gateway enhancements to utilize the modified email headers, validate the email source, check the performance rating of the sender and ESP, and determine the disposition of the incoming emails.

A Performance Measurement and Rating process – including:

- A mechanism for collecting sender and ESP performance data at the email gateway;
- A service that accepts all performance data, abuse complaints and unsubscribe requests; and
- A mechanism to calculate performance ratings for registered senders and ESPs.

Each of these three major aspects of the blueprint is described in detail in the following sections.




Fig. 3 – Systems Architecture

## 4.2 Certification and Registration Services

The Registry offers three primary services: the Certification service; the Registration service; and the Reputation service. These provide a verified and secure identity and associated electronic credentials to high volume senders and ESPs and, in turn, make the performance and identity information publicly available. A simple architectural view is shown in Fig. 4 and the functionality of the services explained in more detail below.




Fig. 4 – Primary Registry Services

### 4.2.1 Sender and ESP Certification Service

#### 4.2.1.1 Certification Service Functions

The Certification Service can be operated by the Registry directly or can be operated by an independent Certificate Authority (CA). There can be multiple CA's and Registry operators.

The certification process starts with both high volume senders and ESPs applying for certification. They must provide sufficient information to clearly identify their true business or personal identity, and agree to adhere to the Terms of Certification as published by the Registry or Certification Authority. The operators of the CA or Registry use this information to verify the identity of the sender or ESP.

There will be multiple levels of Certification with higher levels of certification requiring a more in-depth authentication process. The highest levels of certification may be outside the reach of a small business or other small senders. Therefore, a Registry or CA may choose to issue less expensive, lower grade certifications based on a less rigorous identity check. Email gateways may choose to handle incoming mail differently based on the level of security of the associated certification. A lower grade certification may, for instance, become subject to sending rate limits by mail gateways. In combination with a good reputation, a lower level certification should nevertheless work as well as a high level certification. Reputations therefore ensure that even the cheap, quick certification process available to small businesses can lead to reliable email delivery as long as the business adheres to best practices.

While each Registry could establish its own certification classification scheme, and the certification process may be different for commercial and non-commercial senders of email, a consistent notation is proposed

for use by all certifying authorities. The proposed Classification scheme for Senders and ESPs is shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1 – Certified Sender Classification**

<b>Class Designation</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Authentication Mechanisms</b>
A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Large complex (global) organization</li> <li>- Commercial organizations or non-commercial such as not-for-profit organizations, government departments, political parties, or other NGOs</li> <li>- Multiple divisions require certification</li> <li>- Overall high volume of email with multiple points of origin</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Authenticated in 3 spheres: Government, Industry, Financial</li> <li>- Business registration number, Tax ID, Articles of Incorporation</li> <li>- Dunn &amp;Bradstreet DUNs #</li> <li>- Registered Charity number</li> <li>- Credit letter or Credit card</li> <li>- Postal address validation</li> </ul>
B	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Medium size business</li> <li>- Single point of certification</li> <li>- High volume of email with few points of origin</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Authenticated in 2 spheres: Government, Financial</li> <li>- Business registration number, Tax ID, or Registered Charity number</li> <li>- Credit letter or Credit card</li> <li>- Postal address validation</li> </ul>
C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Small, home business</li> <li>- Medium volume of email with single point of origin</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Authenticated in 1 sphere: Financial</li> <li>- Credit card, billing address verification</li> </ul>
D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Anonymous individual</li> <li>- Restricted to very low volume in the order of &lt; 100 email/day</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certification of Identity of Sender has not been performed</li> <li>- Used in combination with certified ESP/ISP</li> </ul>

Internet Service Provider and Web mail providers will want to apply for Certification under the framework proposed above. Certifications tied to an ISP will support small business Senders (with Level C certification) as well as personal mail users (with Level D certification) who wish to remain anonymous. For instance, consumer oriented ISPs (e.g. Yahoo, Hotmail) may limit free mail to 100 messages per day and choose to require very little in terms of proof of identity. Alternatively, an ISP may require that all subscribers offer some form of proof of identity such that their usage can be tracked internally, but keep this confidential and not include it in the outbound message header. Likewise an ESP serving small businesses will require proof of ability to pay, but may have a relatively light weight verification mechanism and a corresponding rate limit – perhaps 10,000 a month at the lowest levels of certification.

Inexpensive, lightweight certifications are only viable if a service provider is motivated to monitor the performance of senders and use measures like rate limits as a means to enforce their performance and compliance with Volume Email Standards. Project Lumos introduces performance rating for ESPs as the primary solution for keeping ESPs (including ISPs) honest about their adherence to volume mail standards. Without rating the ESPs, the situation exists where either the accommodations for small senders amount to a big spam loophole, or where small senders are simply shut out. Neither is acceptable.

The Certification process should be based on existing mechanisms appropriate to the sphere and geography of operation of the Authority. Once the identity has been verified, the service will issue electronic credentials (signed certificates) to the applicants who will use these to validate the emails they send.

A Registry will be able to revoke the certification or change the electronic credentials of the senders and ESPs should their identities later prove to be invalid or the credentials be compromised.

#### 4.2.1.2 Electronic Credentials

Robust security requirements suggest the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) cryptography for authentication. Project Lumos is nevertheless not based on any specific mechanism or standard for securely representing identity and can be implemented based on a number of existing and emerging standards and technologies.

For initial implementation, certificates could, for instance, be based on existing X.509v3.0 certificate formats containing the identity, classification, certifying authority, and Public Key of each of the certified Senders and ESPs. In addition to HTTP and LDAP servers, it is envisioned that the DNS infrastructure might be used as the distribution mechanism for Public Keys, Volume Mail Standards, and other information.

Both sender and mail server certificates must be based on a lightweight, specialized email certificate format to minimize bandwidth consumption and encryption/decryption processing.

#### 4.2.2 Volume Email Standards

The Project Lumos architectural blueprint is built on process, technology, and policy. Volume Email Standards are the policy component forming the foundation for an agreement between the email senders and ESPs, and receiving email gateways. Registries will specify mailing Standards that senders and ESPs agree to adhere to as part of the registration process. Gateways will measure particular criteria to assess performance against these Standards.

##### 4.2.2.1 Baseline Criteria Example

Table 2 provides an example of a baseline set of high-volume email Standards.

**Table 2 – Baseline High Volume Email Standards**

<b>Performance Criteria</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Example Baseline</b>
Bounce Handling Standard – Hard	The way in which the originating mail server handles hard bounce responses from a receiving gateway.	Addresses not retried
Bounce Handling Standard – Soft	The way in which the originating mail server handles soft bounce responses with particular soft bounce codes from a receiving gateway	- Retry Frequency = hourly - Maximum retries = 5
Abuse Reporting Standards	A standardized abuse reporting process used by the Sender and/or ESP, specifying what, to whom and how to report abuse	All abuse reports routed to the Registry
Abuse Handling Standards	The Sender's commitment to action upon receiving an Abuse report from a Recipient (possibly via the recipient's ISP or IT department or the Sender's service provider).	Unsubscribe from all future mailings
Unsubscribe Standards	A standard format for unsubscribe information in emails that would make it possible to incorporate unsubscribe functions directly into the email clients. This would increase consumer confidence in the unsubscribe mechanism.	Standard format to be defined (see the following section)
Unsubscribe Handling Standards	The Sender's commitment to action upon receiving an Unsubscribe request from a Recipient (via a clickable link, a return email, referred email from the ISP or ESP, or verbal request). Unsubscribes will be tracked and logged.	-Unsubscribes routed via the Registry - Processed by ESP within 10 seconds

#### 4.2.2.2 Mail Categorization

In addition to the set of volume email standards, Project Lumos proposes implementing voluntary email Categorization by senders and ESPs. This provides a more specific classification of email where each category receives its own performance rating, allowing improved decision making at the receiving email gateway, with a different response possible for each category. For example, a gateway may choose to accept all person-to-person email from a particular sender while not allowing bulk email delivery. It also offers the potential for less costly processing, allowing delivery of all mail of a particular category for a sender without further analysis.

The following Table proposes a set of email Category descriptions based primarily on the permission type attributed to the list used for the mailing.

**Table 3 – Mail Categorization Proposal**

Category	Type of Email	Comments
Category I – Personal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Personal or business related person to person email</li> <li>Consent is implicit.</li> </ul>	Known individual Sender
Category II – Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Customer service transaction, communication, or notice such as legal or emergency notices, confirmation of receipt (e.g. of an order) or status</li> <li>Consent is implicit.</li> </ul>	Service or transaction related communications triggered by recipient action or legal/emergency requirement.
Category III – First Class Confirmed (Confirmed Opt-in)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Newsletters, discussion boards, product announcements, sale announcements, etc. where the distribution list was created using a confirmation email to the subscriber</li> <li>Consent is explicit and confirmed.</li> </ul>	High volume individually addressed email communications with explicit and confirmed consent from all recipients.
Category IV – First Class (Opt-in)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Newsletters, discussion boards, product announcements, sale announcements, etc. where the distribution list was created using subscriber opt-in.</li> <li>Consent is explicit.</li> </ul>	High volume individually addressed email communications with explicit consent from all recipients.
Category V – Bulk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mailing to existing customers, with a recent prior business relationship, without opt-in. Third party list rentals, opt-out with notice</li> <li>Consent is implicit with opt-out</li> </ul>	One to many mailings to legitimate email lists, without explicit recipient consent
Category VI – Unknown	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unknown or un-trusted origin</li> <li>Consent is unknown.</li> </ul>	Unknown senders, unknown source of email addresses, etc.

#### 4.2.3 Registration Service

Each Registry will publish their “Terms of Registration”, their supported categories of certification, and the volume mailing standards (as per the proposed set described above) to which certified entities must adhere.

The Registration service is fairly simple. It will

- enforce acceptance of the Terms of Registration by senders and ESPs;
- accept the certified identity information and electronic credentials;

- establish the Identity information, an initial placeholder for performance data, and an initial 'null' performance rating in the Registry; and
- Support an appropriate "unsubscribe redirection link" that the sender will incorporate into outbound emails in order to track unsubscribes at the Registry (and any abuse of the unsubscribe process).

#### 4.2.4 Reputation Information Service

The Reputation Service supported by Registries will provide identity information and performance data openly to anyone who requests it, keyed to the certified identity of the sender or ESP. Specific details of the performance data and performance rating information are discussed in Section 4.4 below.

The Blueprint recommends the development of a specifically formatted XML file that would be returned by all Registries in response to a query for the performance data and performance rating information.

#### 4.2.5 Implementation Considerations

It is assumed that there may be multiple physical implementations of Registries operated by different third-party entities.

Furthermore, Certification, Registration, and Reputation services may be offered by the same or different organizations. A few potential scenarios are:

- Current "Certification Authorities" (CAs) extend their services to meet the Blueprint certification service while leaving operations of the Registries to other organizations.
- Organizations provide 'one-stop shopping' of Certification and Registry services.
- An organization offers one-stop shopping but the Certification is outsourced to a CA.
- An independent (set of) Reputation services may emerge providing performance and rating information about senders. These may be "bundled" by a registry or the registry may be implemented around the information/reputation service.

Other situations are possible as well. In any case, the Certification and other Registry Services must provide similar functionality.

In addition, some larger organizations such as corporations, ESP's, governments, or institutions might choose to self-certify and thereby effectively operate their own Registry. This would be permitted under the higher-level certification of an external CA just as it is possible for SSL Certificates and Personal Email certificates today. If a sender decides to self-certify, they will still need to enable certain performance data to be collected by an independent performance rating service.

### 4.3 Volume Mail Delivery Enhancements

Project Lumos requires that in order to make use of the secure identity and performance information certain functionality be implemented at both the ESP and receiving email gateway. Note that there are no fundamental protocol changes; the receiving mail gateways that choose not to implement the Lumos receive side enhancements can continue to use their existing infrastructure to receive mail that was sent with the Lumos enhancements.

Senders and ESPs must follow the Volume Mailing Standards in accordance with their registration agreement. Additionally senders and ESPs need to include email content authentication information as well as certain other information in the email headers.

Receiving email gateways must be able to decrypt and validate the digital signatures, access the performance data, and use this information to route the incoming email. These key enhancements to the volume mail delivery process are shown in the Figure 5 and described in more detail following.




Fig. 5 – Enhanced Volume Email Delivery

#### 4.3.1 Permission Email Information in SMTP Headers

Information such as unsubscribe and abuse return addresses and URLs is required for the proper operation of permission-based email. Project Lumos proposes these be included in the email headers in standard formats. Including these will, over time, allow email clients to help enforce potential legislation (e.g. by rejecting any email without a valid unsubscribe), provide a more trusted unsubscribe mechanism, and provide improved abuse reporting functions. It will also provide a simple, standard means for the gateways to ensure that the incoming email is meeting the volume email standards.

Permission email information added to the SMTP header will include:

X-Unsubscribe-To: The valid email address that can be used for unsubscribing.

X-Unsubscribe-URL: This is a complete URL used for automated unsubscribe. Sending a request to

this URL should unsubscribe the recipient from this list.

- X-Abuse-To: Abuse reporting email address to which ISP's or other Gateway operators should forward abuse reports.
- X-Abuse-URL: This is a complete URL used for automated abuse reporting. Sending a request to this URL should report abuse for this recipient and for this campaign.
- X-Abuse-Copy: Abuse reporting email address to which the ISP or other Gateway operator should forward a copy of all abuse reports. This address will normally be with the registry and used to monitor the performance of Senders and ESPs
- X-Message-Cat: Message Categorization type definition as per the Volume Email Standards section.
- X-Campaign-ID: An alphanumeric string which uniquely identifies the specific volume email contents. It should be unique to the ESP sending the emails.

Each of these additional header fields will use the X-Header extension standard and are therefore optional in individual person-to-person messages and messages sent to small distribution lists. An X-Header based solution provides a simple transition path and minimizes the overall impact on the email infrastructure. In time, receiving email gateways will refuse to accept high volume mailings, or mailings from specific volume ESPs, without these headers and low-volume Senders such as individuals will use the anonymous categorization sending from a known (and well rated) ESP.

#### 4.3.2 Authentication Information in SMTP Headers

Project Lumos stipulates that electronic signatures of both the sender and ESP be included in SMTP headers as secure proof of identity. In addition to providing proof of identity, signing the email will ensure that the email body is not changed, or that valid email headers are not duplicated and placed on invalid email bodies. The sending Mail Server will execute a message digest function, performing an inexpensive hash on the message (e.g. using the standard SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm), encrypt the message digest using the sender's and ESP's private keys (e.g. using the DSS Digital Signature Standard), and include both signatures in the email headers.

The X-header format will also be used for inclusion of the authentication information allowing implementation with no changes or enhancements to standards, servers, or gateways:

- X-Sender-ID: The certified ID issued to a Sender by the CA. Used to identify the Sender and access their public key. This may take the form of the distinguished name of the certificate issuer followed by the certificate serial number
- X-Sender-Sig: The digital signature of the Sender.
- X-Sender-Registry-URL: The URL of the Registry containing the Sender information.
- X-ESP-ID: The certified ID issued to an ESP by the CA. Used to identify the ESP and access their public key.
- X-ESP-Sig: The digital signature of the ESP.
- X-ESP-Registry-URL: The URL of the Registry containing the ESP information.
- X-Message-Dig: The message digest hash result.

With the Registry URL and the ID, receiving email gateways will be able to acquire the published public keys from the registry and decrypt the digital signature of both the ESP and the sender to validate their identities and the content of the email.

Once these have been more widely adopted, the proposed X-Header extensions should be considered under the IETF's RFC process for standardization and permanent adoption into SMTP.

### 4.3.3 Receiving Email Gateways

Receiving email gateways will implement their own delivery policies based on their ability to identify a registered sender and ESP, and access their reputation – the historical performance record of this sender.

#### 4.3.3.1 Authentication at the Receiving Email Gateway

An email gateway will perform the following functions and make a decision based on its own delivery policy for the disposition of incoming email. For performance reasons, email gateways are likely to utilize a combination of caching and other performance optimizations to reject clearly non-compliant messages early in the process.

Authenticate the ESP – The gateway will use the originating ESP's identification contained in the email header to look up the ESP's public key in the Registry. It will then decrypt the ESP's digital signature in the header comparing against the message digest to validate the identity of the ESP.

Authenticate the Sender – The gateway will use the sender's identification contained in the email header to look up the sender's public key in the Registry. It will decrypt the digital signature in the header in a similar fashion to validate the identity of sender.

Check Performance Ratings – When it requests the public keys, the gateway will also receive the latest performance ratings for each of the sender and originating ESP from the Registry. It will update any local cache and classify the incoming messages in accordance with their performance rating.

Authenticate the email content – The gateway may further validate the email contents by recalculating the message digest on the body of the email, and comparing the results against the value in the header. If they are identical, there is a high certainty that the message has not been tampered with.

Message Disposition – Once classified, the gateway will route the email message, either sending it to the recipients inbox, routing it to the bulk mail folder, or rejecting outright, based on the gateway's locally set criteria.

Once this process has been completed for the first incoming message of an email campaign, all other messages may be treated in a similar fashion. Moreover, if the ESP has proven to not follow the established standards, or if they are not registered, the message stream may be rejected without further processing.

#### 4.3.3.2 Caching and Performance Optimizations (Recommended)

The most cost effective place for an Email Gateway to reject an incoming message is at the point of connection from the sending mail server. The second most cost effective point of rejection is after reading the headers, but without analyzing the entire message body. These performance optimizations can be achieved with a combination of IP white listing and public key caching.

Registries will publish the IP addresses of all registered mail servers. Email gateways can use their existing white list technology to reject all connections from mail servers that are not registered at a known registry. White list information, much like block list information, can be cached locally or looked up at a DNS server maintained by each registry.

For performance reasons, receiving gateways should cache the sender and ESP information, including their public keys and latest performance rating. This would eliminate the step of requiring a query to one or more Registries each time a new mail stream was initiated and reduce processing and bandwidth resources at the

gateway. Aging criteria on the cache will be required to ensure latest performance rating is available as well to validate that the public keys have not been revoked or changed.

Numerous other optimizations are possible with volume messages. For example, an email gateway might choose to completely validate an incoming message with a unique campaign id, but skip some steps on subsequent messages over the same connection with the same campaign ID, sender, and ESP.


## 4.4 Performance Measurement and Rating

The primary goal of performance measurement and rating is to establish the ‘reputation’ or track record (good or bad ) of senders and ESPs over time. Project Lumos proposes the establishment of a Reputation Service that is focused on collecting, consolidating, and disseminating objective, network wide information about senders and ESPs such that recipients and gateways can use this information to determine how to treat incoming mail. Since the performance rating would be tied to the secure identity, changing identities of the sender will cause the loss of their established performance record making it difficult to churn identities. Senders or ESPs with no proven track record (i.e. with no reputation) will be treated cautiously by the receiving gateways.

It is not sufficient to rate only the mail sender. The sender’s agency (ESP), if any, must also be rated. This provides additional necessary controls in the system and is critical to the enforcement mechanism:

- Motivating ESPs to police their clients;
- Providing a reputation surrogate for new senders who have not yet established a reputation;
- Providing a means of aggregating small senders such that they can be held accountable for their abuse complaints.

The performance ratings for senders and ESPs are based on the historical performance information measured and provided by a variety of receiving gateways and through redirects and referrals of un subscribes and abuse complaints from the recipients. The Performance Data Acquisition service of the Registry captures and consolidates the data, while the Performance Rating service executes an algorithm that determines the ratings. This is depicted in Fig. 6 below with details described in the following sections.



**Fig. 6 – Performance Measurement and Rating**

The performance rating algorithm will be developed by a Rating Service, which in most cases will be operated by a Registry. However, the base performance data will be made available in order for receiving gateways, existing anti-spam products, or external performance rating agencies (similar to the operation of credit agencies) to implement their own performance rating schemes.

#### 4.4.1 Performance Data

Performance data is collected and associated with Campaign ID, Sender ID, and ESP ID providing unique identification and summarization capabilities. Sender ID and ESP ID are defined through the certification process while the Campaign ID provides a convenient way for Senders or their agents to track their individual mailings and identify potential performance and compliance related problems. Project Lumos proposes collecting the following Performance data as the basis of the performance rating.

**Table 4 – Performance Data Measurements**

<b>Performance Criteria</b>	<b>Description</b>
Message Volume	The total volume of email sent in a particular campaign as well as the aggregate volume from each Sender and ESP. Volume is also tracked for each sender and ESP by category of email, using the categorizations described earlier.
Hard Bounce Count	The count of hard bounces, messages without a valid, known email address. This will be a good indicator of the quality of the email address lists used.
Duplicate Unsubscribe Count	The count of duplicate unsubscribe requests by the same recipient, on the same list from separate campaigns. A duplicate unsubscribe is an indication that the sender is not handling unsubscribe requests properly.
Abuse Complaint Count	The count of the number of unique recipients who report a particular campaign as spam. The abuse complaint rate will be a key factor in the performance rating. While some complaints may be unjustified, the majority of abuse complaints indicate that the sending of the email to this recipient was inappropriate.
Repeat Abuse Complaints	Repeat offenses of spam complaints are indicative that the ESP or sender is not taking appropriate action in response to complaints.
Receiving Gateway Abuse Complaints	This is a count of the number of complaints from Gateway administrators who complaint about the ESP's volume emailing technical practices (such as abusing bounce retry guidelines, receive rate too high, etc.).
Accuracy of email categorization	A true/false value indicating if the message type has been categorized correctly (as per the Volume Email Standards). Since the sender or ESP will set the category, an assessment of whether the email was categorized correctly will provide a means of policing the accuracy.
Recipient Rating	An indicator of Recipient's subjective view of the value and quality of the received email. This may be used in future implementations of performance using a "Rate this Email" feedback function in the email client.

Some of this data defined above will be used in initial Rating formulas such as the example proposed below, while some data (such as the Recipient Rating) may be used later as industry experience grows and rating formulas increase in sophistication.

#### 4.4.2 Performance Data Acquisition Service

The Performance Data Acquisition service performs three significant functions. It collects and consolidates basic performance data as measured by the gateways. It captures abuse complaints directly from recipients. And finally, it captures unsubscribe requests in order to assess the senders' compliance to unsubscribe handling standards.

Registries should be prepared to accept partial data. For example, they should accept abuse complaints and unsubscribes even if the receiving gateways are not yet prepared to provide the hard bounce count.

#### 4.4.2.1 Basic Performance Data

The Registries will implement a Data Acquisition Service to capture performance data from a potentially very large number of receiving gateways, and consolidate, organize and store the data for the reported sender or ESP. The information to be captured is based on the Volume Email Standards and the Performance Data Measurements described in Table 4.

Receiving email Gateways will be expected to play a direct role in the development of the performance ratings. They will be responsible for measurement and forwarding of performance information to the Registry(s). With each new incoming volume email campaign, they collect and report on the data.

Standard performance data reporting syntax and semantics will be required to enable the Performance Data Acquisition Service. Project Lumos recommends the implementation of the reporting function as follows:

- The data must include Campaign ID, Sender ID, and originating ESP ID thereby providing unique, campaign level tracking and scoring.
- The data must be reported to the Registry for the sender and that of the ESP, or only one if available.
- An initial report on a newly received campaign should be constructed and submitted within no more than 24 hours of the receipt of the first emails in the campaign.
- The time period covered by the report should be included in the submission.
- The reporting mechanism would allow for ‘updates’ of the data, possibly on a daily basis, as more recipients open the emails and potentially take action such as unsubscribing or reporting abuse.
- The reporting format would include an attribute to distinguish an initial report for a newly received campaign to that of an update for a previously reported campaign.
- An earlier submission or more frequent submissions would be acceptable
- An XML document format should be standardized for submission of the performance data

Prior to the development of standard report document formats, Registries should initially offer at least two alternatives for submission: a secure web form submissions, and a text file submission on a specified tag-value format.

#### 4.4.2.2 Capturing Abuse Complaints

Project Lumos proposes the development of a standardized Abuse Reporting Process starting with the abuse reporting addresses embedded in the headers of the emails. As part of this process, in addition to the abuse reports being sent to the sender and ESP of the volume email, they will be copied to the appropriate Registries.

The Registries will use the Sender ID, ESP ID, and Campaign ID embedded in the headers to properly categorize the abuse report. Moreover, they will check if the recipient has reported a prior abuse from this sender. ‘Repeat Abuse Reports’ will be particularly damaging to the sender’s performance rating.

#### 4.4.2.3 Processing Unsubscribes

Spammers often abuse the unsubscribe process by including fake unsubscribe links in spam email. Establishing a trusted unsubscribe mechanism is accomplished in Project Lumos by associating the secure identity of the sender with the oversight of unsubscribe processing. In order to determine that the proper actions are being taken in response to unsubscribe requests from the recipients, the Registry must be made aware of all of these requests. Project Lumos proposes that the unsubscribe mechanism employ a web redirection process to accomplish this.

The ‘unsubscribe redirection link’ format must be accepted as part of the registration terms. The ESPs will use this format when constructing a complete link by concatenating the redirection URL, the sender and ESP IDs, and other campaign specific information generated by the ESP.

These complete links will then be built into the: i) header of the email where it can be interpreted by the email client; and ii) body of the email as is current practice today. In the short term, the link in the body of the email will be used for unsubscribing. Eventually it may be replaced by email client software functionality.

#### 4.4.3 Performance Rating

The Performance rating formula will calculate an objective value representing the sender's and ESP's reputations from some of the measured data over time.

$$\text{Rating} = f(\text{Hard Bounce Count, Repeat Unsubscribes, Abuse reports, Volume, Time})$$

The Blueprint proposes an initial, simplified rating algorithm as a working example. It is expected that the Registries or other performance monitoring agencies will develop their own formulas, and that these will become more sophisticated as the industry gains more experience with the available data. As there is currently no reliable data on which to build a score, it is likely that any initial formula can and will be improved.

##### 4.4.3.1 Proposed Rating Scale

It is proposed that the performance ratings be scored on a simple 0-100 point numerical scale, where 100 is perfect and a null or empty score corresponds to no rating.

All reputation scores are built from publicly available data stored at the Registry. Any organization could query this data and devise its own scoring system. The scoring from 0 to 100 is specified to enforce a standard in score semantics.

##### 4.4.3.2 A Simple Rating Formula

Like a financial credit rating, the performance rating ages over time. The example formula uses 100 days as the time window so that a quarterly sender can maintain their reputation. The score for the current 100 days is doubled and added to the score for the previous 100 days and then the total divided by 3. This gives a weighted average for the last 200 days.

The total Performance Rating is calculated as

$$\text{Rating} = \text{Minimum}[ 0, ( 2 * \text{CurrentScore} ) + \text{previous 100 day score} ] / 3 ]$$

While the basic measure of the score for the most recent period is:

$$\text{CurrentScore} = 100 - (\text{AbuseRate} * 1000) - \text{BounceRate} - (\text{DupUnsubRate} * 10000)$$

Where:

AbuseRate = 100-day running average of the abuse rate where the absolute number of reports exceeds X/100,000 where X is known number. The 100-day running average ensures that a quarterly mailer can maintain their reputation.

Furthermore, due to current abuse reporting mechanisms, a minimum threshold of abuse complaints must be exceeded to ensure some level of statistically meaningful accuracy for very small senders. For illustration purposes, this threshold is set at 5 for a 100-day period.

BounceRate = 100-day running average of the bounce rate.

DupUnsubRate = 100-day running average of the duplicate unsubscribe rate. Note that this is a duplicate unsubscribe on the same list from separate mailings; mailers are not penalized when someone hits "unsubscribe" multiple times on the same mailing.

To use an example, if a relatively large sender, has the following campaigns, all sent to his entire list:

Campaign Name	Date	Send Count	Abuse Count	Bounce Count	Duplicate Unsubscribe
New Store Opening	May 10 <sup>th</sup>	400,000	1	80,000	0
A New Look	June 1 <sup>st</sup>	425,000	25	200	0
Our Renovated Web Site	July 15 <sup>th</sup>	500,000	2	400	0

The 100 day send volume is:  $\text{Volume} = 400,000 + 425,000 + 500,000 = 1,325,000$   
The 100 day abuse rate is:  $\text{AbuseRate} = (28/1,325,000) * 100 = 0.002\%$   
The 100 day bounce rate is:  $\text{BounceRate} = (80,600/1,325,000) * 100 = 6.0\%$

Giving a current score of:  $\text{CurrentScore} = 100 - (0.002*1000) - 6 - 0 = 92$

Note that failure to remove bounced addresses from the list would presumably give:

$\text{Volume} = 400,000 + (425,000 + 80,000) + (500,000 + 80,200) = 1,485,200$

$\text{BounceRate} = ((80,000 + 80,200 + 80,600)/1,485,200)*100 = 16$

Resulting in a total current score of:

$\text{CurrentScore} = 100 - (.002*1000) - 16 = 82$

In practice, however, the score would most likely be lower as senders who fail to remove bounces generally also have poor unsubscribe and abuse handling practices leading to penalties on those scores as well.

Looking at a second example of a small sender, with a somewhat seasonal business:

Campaign Name	Date	Send Count	Abuse Count	Bounce Count	Duplicate Unsubscribe
Winter Newsletter	January 15 <sup>th</sup>	500	0	50	0
Spring Newsletter	April 11 <sup>th</sup>	2,500	2	350	0
Father's Day	June 6 <sup>th</sup>	4,000	2	325	0

Here the total abuse count in the period is less than 5, so it is ignored. Note that one more mailing with 2 abuse complaints would put this mailer over the abuse count minimum and the rate would be computed as part of their score.

The 100 day send volume is:  $\text{Volume} = 500 + 2,500 + 4,000 = 7,000$   
The 100 day abuse rate is:  $\text{AbuseRate} = 0$  (did not exceed minimum threshold of 5)  
The 100 day bounce rate is:  $\text{BounceRate} = (725/7,000) * 100 = 10.3\%$

Giving a current score of:  $\text{CurrentScore} = 100 - (0 * 1000) - 10.3 = 89.7$

When performing the calculation for an ESP, the abuse and bounce rates consider the total number of abuse complaints, bounces, and email volume for all of the senders using that ESP. Thus the ESP score is not a simple average of its users' scores, but is weighted such that higher volume senders have a larger impact on the rating.

Calculating the score for an ESP that provided service to both of the above senders in this example:

The 100 day send volume is:  $\text{Volume} = 1,325,000 + 7000 = 1,332,000$   
The 100 day abuse rate is:  $\text{AbuseRate} = ((28 + 4)/1,332,000) * 100 = 0.0024\%$   
The 100 day bounce rate is:  $\text{BounceRate} = (81,325/1,332,000) * 100 = 6.1\%$

Giving the ESP a current score of:  $\text{CurrentScore} = 100 - (0.0024*1000) - 6.1 - 0 = 91.5$

With the total Performance Rating calculated as

$$\text{Rating} = \text{Minimum}[ 0, ((2 * \text{CurrentScore}) + \text{previous 100 day score}) / 3 ]$$

A mailer with a current score of 90 and a previous score of 60 would have a Rating =  $((2*90) + 60)/3 = 80$ .

Conversely, if performance had degraded and the current score was 60 with a previous score of 90, then the result would be: Rating =  $((2*60) + 90)/3 = 70$ .

Improved performance is rewarded while degraded performance is punished. While the scoring formula could conceivably result in a negative number (for a very high abuse or duplicate unsubscribe rate), the Minimum performance rating is set to zero.

#### 4.4.3.3 Other Rating Formulas and Future Improvements

The previous is a simplistic example to show how several of the performance measurement factors can be incorporated into the calculation – abuse and bounce rates are widely understood concepts, even if not currently accurately reported. As the industry gains experience with the data, better formulas will emerge.

It is easy to imagine an improved formula that ages out more gracefully over a longer period of time. For example, averaging over a year but assigning heavier weights to more recent time periods. Future improvements may also include adding data to the performance scoring, such as a scheme for reporting and tracking category violations separately from general abuse complaints or a recipient rating system. These have not been included here in order to simplify the initial deployment proposal.



## 5. Phased Implementation

Implementation of Project Lumos will not be a rapid cutover but require a phased transition over 18-24 months. Basic sender and server certification and secure identity will be implemented first. Basic performance tracking will be implemented in the near term, while more detailed aspects (such as sender and ESP rating) will require additional time. The following phased approach appears to be aggressive yet realistic.

Phase 1 – implemented in 1 to 6 months

- All commercial high volume ESPs will publish their mail server IP addresses, and provide the X-Unsubscribe-To, X-Unsubscribe-URL, X-Abuse-To, X-Abuse-URL, X-Abuse-copy, X-Message-Cat, and X-Campaign-ID headers.

Phase 2 – implemented in 6-12 months

- All commercial high volume ESPs will provide digital signatures and all header information described above in Section 4.3. Servers must encrypt headers and provide a message digest. Some senders may not yet have a public/private key pair.
- All commercial ESPs and Senders will conform to at the proposed baseline Volume Email Standards as a minimum.
- Lists of high volume commercial ESPs (containing IP addresses, Domain Names, Certified IDs, and their Public Keys) will be published by NAI and other industry groups. This will include Senders where digital certificates are available.
- Anti-spam filters may be tightened up for volume ESPs and Senders that have not been registered.

Phase 3 – implemented within 18 months

- Will see the first Email trust Registries beginning operation. They will expand the certification process and begin the issuing email specific certificates.
- Other volume Senders will obtain the new certificates and commercial Senders and ESPs will replace their certificates.
- At this time it is expected that all volume email will use encrypted headers and anti-spam filtering settings may be tightened further. Current anti-spam software may begin to evolve into email performance measurement software.
- Basic performance monitoring and reporting begins at the Receiving Email Gateways and the measurement information is submitted to the Registries.

Phase 4 – implemented in about 18–24 months

- Registries, with their certification and performance rating services, are in full operation. All volume email will be subject to authentication, performance ratings checks and performance monitoring,

By the end of Phase 4, email sent from unknown, unregistered Senders and/or ESPs will be unlikely to get through to recipients' inboxes or will be rate limited disallowing any high-volume delivery without secure identity.

## **6. Conclusion**

### **6.1 Summary**

By holding the sender and the Email Service Provider accountable for their sending practices and the content of their volume email, the email spam problem may be virtually eliminated. The solution described in detail in this document proposes a Registry-based architecture that implements this accountability.

A Certification Service will ensure that each high volume email sender and ESP verify their identity and commit to a set of standards for sending volume email. A secure method, built around a lightweight PKI implementation, for including the sender identity, ESP identity, and a message digest in the email headers will allow the receiving email gateways to validate the source and content of the emails. And finally, the reputations of registered senders and ESPs will be established through continuous measurement of their performance in compliance with accepted volume mail standards. Finally, an objective rating will be calculated for each sender and ESP based on their historical performance.

With secure identities, knowledge of the best practice standards, and performance ratings available from a Registry, receiving email gateways will be equipped to make informed decisions about processing incoming email. Based on the sender's reputation they will have the option of passing the mail freely, subjecting it to a series of anti-spam filters, routing mail to a bulk mail folder, or blocking the email altogether.

Project Lumos presents an open, decentralized architectural model based on evolving inter-operable standards for information sharing. A phased approach to implementation is expected. Implementation will be facilitated through a requirement for backwards compatibility with existing email technologies providing inter-operability for organizations that choose not to implement an actual solution.

### **6.2 Outstanding Issues**

There remain a few key outstanding issues that must be addressed prior to the implementation.

1. Who will own and operate the Registries, and under what detailed business model?
2. Is a separate Organization required to oversee the operations of the Registries and provide a dispute resolution mechanism?
3. How does Project Lumos work with the standards bodies such as the IETF to create the standards necessary to ensure effective definition and communication of the identity and performance data?

Discussion within and external to the NAI ESPC has begun to resolve these issues.

### **6.3 Next Steps**

There are several key activities, both short and longer term, required in the implementation of Project Lumos. Short-term next steps, to be addressed within the next couple of months, include:

- Industry providing critical analysis and feedback on the blueprint contained in this white paper.
- Finalizing the baseline Volume Email Standards outlined above.
- Finalizing an initial set of performance data collection and reporting protocols.
- Agreement on an initial Certificate format, leveraging existing technology as much as possible, for Phase 1 implementation.

In the 2-6 month term, next steps required include:

- Preparation and submission of draft standards for extension of the email headers including both the authentication information and permission email information.
- Development of XML document format standards for the submission of performance reporting information and access to performance rating information.

- Development and submission of a draft standard for a lightweight PKI certificate for email.
- Begin discussions regarding Certification and Registry operation with interested industry partners.

With these issues addressed, implementation of a trial Registry may be achieved within 3-9 months.



## Appendices

### FAQs

Q. How does Project Lumos stop SPAM?

A. By holding the owner of the mail server and the mail originator responsible for what they send and how they send it. Recipients' actions will directly impact performance ratings and their mail gateways won't accept poorly rated mail.

Q. How is a Spammer shut off?

A. A spammer that attempts to subvert the system or violate the registration agreement may be shut off by having their certification pulled. This will be the responsibility of the Registry. But because of the performance rating system, a great deal of the more mundane enforcement will occur as a natural result of the sender's and ESP's desire to maintain their brands and the viability of their businesses. Economic incentives are powerful. ESPs will not permit errant senders to degrade their performance rating, and Senders with legitimate businesses will, like all legitimate business owners everywhere, guard their reputations.

Q. Privacy – how do those who need to remain anonymous get their mail through?

A. By spring 2004 they will need to use a service that supports anonymity. Presumably non-commercial mailbox providers will continue to provide this service. Non-commercial mailbox servers may choose to implement rate limiters to protect their performance ratings.

Q. What happens to the small non-commercial ESP?

A. By spring 2004 they will need to obtain an "SSL-like" certificate, but nothing except deliverability concerns forces them to do this.

Q. Can a non-commercial originator use a commercial sender?

A. Yes. The originator's credentials do not need to come from the same authority as the mail sender's. This may be common in that organizations such as UNICEF may choose to use a commercial ESP.

Q. What about free mailbox providers?

A. In the simplest scenario, they may choose to rate limit and classify their users as "anonymous". Others may offer Sender certification services. Providers that neither control sending through their mail server nor require authentication will tend towards poor performance ratings.

## Acknowledgements and Contact Information

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## Other Anti-spam Initiatives

There are a number of other anti-spam initiatives underway. They may be categorized into public organization or private consortium initiatives, server-based anti-spam solutions, and client-based (desktop or laptop) anti-spam solutions. Examples of each of these are described below.

### Public or Private Consortium Initiatives

#### IETF/IRTF Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG)

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) supports a number of small research groups within its Research Task Force (IRTF) working on topics related to Internet Protocols, applications, architecture and technology. Formed in Feb. 2003, the charter (available at <http://www.irtf.org/charters/asrg.html>) of the ASRG describes that:

“The purpose of the ASRG is to understand the problem [of unwanted email messages] and collectively propose and evaluate solutions to the problem. While some techniques focus on local text classification approaches, many traditional and evolving techniques include approaches that involve new network architectures or changes to the existing applications and protocols.

ASRG will investigate the spam problem as a large-scale network problem. The ASRG will begin its work by developing a taxonomy of the problem and the proposed solutions. This taxonomy should involve casting the spam problem into different perspectives, such as examining the similarities between spam and denial-of-service; spam and intrusion detection/prevention; and spam and authentication, authorization, and accounting.

ASRG will consider the issues of deployment for proposed solutions, emphasizing the investigation of methods that have a realistic chance of wide-scale deployment.

The work of the ASRG will also include investigating techniques to evaluate the usefulness and cost of proposed solutions. Usefulness is described by the effectiveness, accuracy, and incentive structure of the system. The cost of the system refers to the burden imposed on users and operators of the communications system. These costs include any changes to the normal use of the system or actual changes in the monetary costs of using the system.”

To date the ASRG has produced draft documents on Requirements and Technical Considerations (such as approaches and evaluation criteria for adoption) for spam control.

#### TRUSTe

TRUSTe is an independent, nonprofit organization that offers a number of privacy certification and “trusted seal” programs for web sites and email. TRUSTe is sponsored by a coalition of web publishers, software companies and service providers. Organizations may display the Trust seal on their web site and/or within their email if they agree to a number of information privacy practices and display a clear privacy policy. An oversight and complain handling process supplement the seal programs.

TRUSTe also provides program certification, oversight, and dispute resolution services for Ironport’s Bonded Sender program. TRUSTe monitors complaint rates, audit compliance with program standards for senders, and resolves disputes related to the legitimacy of complaints.

## Trusted Email Open Standard

The ePrivacy Group released a white paper presenting the “Trusted Email Open Standard” (TEOS) on April 30, 2003. TEOS proposed an approach to the fighting spam that includes three key aspects:

- creating a trusted identity for email senders based on secure, lightweight electronic signatures in email headers, optimized with DNS-based systems for flexibility and ease of implementation.
- providing a standard structure for including trusted assertions about the content and sender/recipient relationship in the headers of individual messages. ISPs and email recipients could use these assertions to manage their email.
- Allowing the inclusion of an optional, visible ‘trust seal’ in the email for high volume senders along with standard practices, an oversight board and dispute resolution mechanism.

The ePrivacy Group is also offering royalty-free email Send and Receive engines incorporating the first two of the aspects above. The white paper is available at <http://www.eprivacygroup.com/teos>.

## SenderBase

SenderBase is a free information service offered by IronPort Systems Inc. to email administrators to help them distinguish between legitimate sources of email (by IP address) from spam. SenderBase provides a global measurement of email volume, groups related sources of email, and is building a profile on individual senders. The information is available via a web interface at [www.senderbase.org](http://www.senderbase.org).

## AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo!, Earthlink Anti-Spam Initiative

Microsoft, AOL and Yahoo, all large email service providers, announced in April 2003 that they will work together and lead a broader online industry effort to address spam. The group will initiate an open dialogue that will include organizations across the industry to drive technical standards and industry guidelines that can be adopted regardless of platform. Their initiative will focus on 4 main areas:

- Protecting consumers from receiving spam through the prevention of deceptive techniques in email headers that conceal the identity of the email sender and source of the email by leveraging existing directories of Internet addresses such as the Domain Name System, and inhibit email from systems determined to be open to unauthorized use.
- Preventing the use of their email services to send spam through elimination of fraudulent email accounts and exchanging consumer complaints and sender information to ensure a spammer does not just move to another ESP.
- Develop a set of commercial email standards, technical approaches, policies and best practices for businesses to communicate with consumers through email.
- Working with law enforcement agencies to augment their efforts against spammers who rely on fraudulent means of transmission.

These joint initiatives complement individual efforts by each of the three providers to enhance email-filtering capabilities, simplify abuse complaint reporting, and pursue legal action against spammers.

## SpamAssassin

SpamAssassin is an open source anti-spam product that uses a variety of techniques for filtering incoming email. It uses a rule base to process both email headers and the body text, accesses a number of blacklists such as [ordb.org](http://ordb.org) and [mail-abuse.org](http://mail-abuse.org), and also accessing a database of previously reported spam to filter like messages.

SpamAssassin may be deployed at either mail servers or mail clients.

## Server-Based Solutions

### Brightmail

Brightmail is a private company offering anti-spam and anti-virus filtering software to ISPs, large enterprises, governments, and other organizations. Brightmail uses a large set of email addresses to collect illegitimate spam email and uses these to establish a set of source address, header rules, and content rules to identify spam. These “signature files” and blacklist entries are subsequently loaded into production installations of the Brightmail product at receiving email gateways allowing administrators to identify and delete, modify, or forward the spam email.

Brightmail’s client base consists of a number of large ISPs and telecom service providers.

### IronPort Systems Inc.

Ironport offers a family of email infrastructure Messaging Gateway Appliances. Their “A-Series” products are optimized for high volume commercial email delivery systems, while the “C-Series” are built for the management and anti-spam filtering of incoming corporate email traffic. IronPort incorporate the technology of partners Dell, Brightmail and Boldfish products.

In addition IronPort offers two services to the email community, the Bonded Sender program and the SenderBase information service. The Bonded Sender program, currently in public beta trial, requires that commercial email senders agree to a set of standards and post a financial bond to ensure the integrity of their email. Recipients who feel they have received an unsolicited email from a bonder sender may complain and a charge is deducted from the bond.

### ePrivacy Group

The ePrivacy group is a privately held company providing consulting and training services related to electronic privacy programs and has developed and released software technology and products to combat the spam problem. ePrivacy’s technology offerings include “Postiva” which allows the inclusion of trust stamps in volume email and SpamSquelcher which reduces the receipt rate of incoming email traffic identified as spam. The ePrivacy group also jointly administers the “Trusted Sender” program with TRUSTe.

### Habeas, Inc.

Habeas is a private company offering Sender Warranted Email<sup>SM</sup>, a service to identify email originating from registered users. Senders obtain a license to include a special header containing a copyrighted haiku poem in email that complies with Habeas guidelines. Receiving gateways are expected to interpret incoming email containing the headers as ‘not spam’. Should a non-registered user incorporate the special headers, Habeas has promised legal action against copyright infringement.

### CipherTrust Inc.

CipherTrust is a private company that provides security solutions to enterprise email systems. Its main product is “IronMail”, a secure email gateway appliance that sits between the corporate network firewall and the mail server. IronMail may be configured to include anti-virus, anti-spam, secure webmail access, and secure delivery between email servers using encrypted connections. Anti-spam capabilities include blacklists, whitelist capabilities, content-based filtering, and rules-based header analysis among others.

## SpamArrest

SpamArrest is a private company offering a subscription-based anti-spam service to consumers. The SpamArrest service uses a challenge-response mechanism for preventing the receipt of email from automated senders. When an email arrives from an unknown sender, a reply email is sent back asking the sender to verify themselves by clicking on a link to the Spam Arrest website. The link takes them to a page where they are instructed to type in a word that is shown in a picture. This step prevents automated systems, such as those used to send spam, from authorizing themselves, yet is easy for any human to complete. Senders may also be pre-authorized by the end-user to prevent the challenge-response.

## Client Based Solutions

The following is a cross section of examples of PC based products for combating spam. The NAI ESPC does not endorse or deny the accuracy or value of any of these or other anti-spam products.

### Vanquish

Vanquish is a small private company offering an anti-spam solution similar in concept to the Bonded Sender program. The Vanquish software is installed at the recipient's workstation. When email is received from unknown senders, Vanquish requests an upfront guarantee of payment (through its centralized authentication servers) should the recipient perceive the email as unwanted spam. If the recipient accepts the email (say it is from a legitimate, permission-based list), the sender pays nothing. If not, recipients click a 'Penalty Button' and the Sender is charged a small amount from their guarantee. In this manner, Senders are charged for unwanted bulk email as they would be for bulk postal mail or will refrain from sending the bulk email.

### SpamKiller from McAfee Security

A division of Network Associates, Inc., McAfee Security specializes in desktop security products. It retails Spamkiller, an email filtering product with standard filters updated from an on-line service, customizable filters for the end-user, a capability for whitelisting friends, and an abuse complaint reporting capability.

### Spam Buster from Contact Plus

Contact Plus retails several Windows-based personal software products. Spam Buster works with POP3 email accounts to filter the email before it is downloaded to the recipient's email client. Spam Buster accesses the email account, compares the email message, header information, sender, and size to the user's spam settings defining the message as spam and also checks the sender against a blacklist of known spammers. Spam Buster then displays the email with a red checkmark indicating they are spam, a question mark if the mail appears to be spam, and those on a local whitelist with a special icon. Messages marked as spam may then be deleted with a single click.

### iHateSpam from Sunbelt Software

This product is an email-filtering product specific to MS Outlook, Outlook Express and the Windows operating environment, executing automatically with the operation of the email client software. The filtering mechanism identifies possible spam email and places it in a separate folder inside the mail client for deletion or review by the user. The product supports whitelists of friends, blacklists, and customer filtering rules (in the Outlook version).

## Identity Certification Initiatives

### VeriSign Inc.

VeriSign is a publicly traded company offering security, internet payment, internet registration and related services. VeriSign is best known as one of the largest SSL Certificate Authorities and offers Digital ID's for digitally signing and encrypting email.

Verisign has released a white paper entitled "A Plan for no Spam" advocating improvements in sender authentication and changes to the SMTP protocol.

### US Postal Service – In Person Proofing identity certification program

The U.S. Postal Service formally announced the In Person Proofing (IPP) at Post Offices program to support the activities of US Certificate Authorities and government organizations. Working in conjunction with accredited Certificate Authorities, a process is being developed where applicants for a digital certificate will be required to present themselves in person with hard identification in order to verify their identity. The physical address of the individual will also be validated through the use of the First Class Mail process. From the Federal Register of June 17, 2003:

"An organization can establish a relationship with a qualified U.S. Certificate Authority to integrate digital signing with improved identity verification into an online application. Any individual desiring to use digital certificates that include USPS IPP will complete an application online. The inline system will verify the individual's identity via commercial database checking. The system will then produce a standard Postal Service form to be printed out at the 'applicant's' personal computer. The individual requesting the service will present this form to a participating post office where the 'In Person Proofing' process is conducted. After successful completion of the IPP event, the CA will notify the applicant to download their digital certificate."

## About the NAI's Email Service Provider Coalition:

The Email Service Provider Coalition (ESPC) was formed in November 2002 by the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) to fight spam while protecting the delivery of legitimate email. The ESPC is comprised of 37 members including aQuantive, Blue Dolphin, Digital Impact, DoubleClick, Experian, IMN, and Roving Software. The ESPC members have recognized the need for strong spam solutions that ensure the delivery of legitimate email. To this end, the ESPC has created several crucial sub-committees, including legislative and technical committees, which have been very active in the war against spam. Our flagship initiative, Project Lumos, is an industry proposal for a registry-based solution to the spam problem. For more information on the ESPC, please visit [www.projectlumos.com](http://www.projectlumos.com).

### Founding Members:

Avenue A  
DoubleClick  
Roving Software

Blue Dolphin Group  
Experian

Digital Impact  
IMN

### Members:

@Once  
AFG Media  
Britemoon  
Digital Connexions  
ExactTarget  
Mindshare Design  
Postfuture  
SKYLIST  
Topica  
Virtumundo

Axiom  
BlueHornet Networks, Inc.  
CheetahMail  
eDialog  
Got Marketing  
NetCreations  
Quris  
SmartSource  
Traffix, Inc.  
WebSideStory

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BlueStreak  
ClickAction  
Eversave  
Mediaplex  
Performics  
Responsys  
SourceLink  
Transend

**The Work of the NAI ESPC:**

Email is indeed a "killer app" and has been a major component in the productivity and efficiency gains of the digital economy. But those gains will be lost if email becomes unreliable as a communications tool. According to a report by Assurance Systems, in the first half of 2003, subscribers to the major ISPs did not receive an average of 17% of permission-based email. Businesses will not be able to use email if they cannot have a reasonable assurance that their messages will be delivered. Simply stated, a 17% failure rate for delivery of email is not tenable for communications with customers.

The ESP Coalition is currently working on many fronts to address the spam problem and, at the same time, ensure the continued delivery of permission-based email. We have groups that are working on technological solutions, groups working with the ISPs to refine filtering tools, and groups working to ensure that consumers are aware of the problem of false positives. The Coalition is also working to educate public policy makers on the need for balance in any legislative or regulatory solutions to the spam problem. Again, it is critical that we have strong tools in place to fight spam, but those tools cannot be so blunt as to damage the legitimate use of emails in today's marketplace.